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Agrarian Commonwealth or Entrepôt of the 
Orient? Competing Conceptions of Canada and the 
BC Terms of Union Debate of 1871
FORREST D. PASS
Abstract
Much of the historiography of British Columbia’s 1871 entry into Confederation 
has concentrated on the motives of British Columbians in seeking union with 
Canada.  This article examines the discussion of the province’s Terms of Union 
in the Canadian parliament and in the eastern Canadian press, and recasts 
the debate as a conflict between two competing visions of Canada’s economic 
future.  Proponents of the admission of British Columbia believed access to 
the Pacific would transform the new Dominion into a commercial superpower. 
Opponents of the Terms looked upon distant, mountainous, and sparsely popu-
lated British Columbia as a liability, a region and a community that, unlike 
the Prairie West, could never conform to the agrarian ideal that underpinned 
their conception of Canada.  A reconsideration of the Terms of Union debate 
in eastern Canada suggests a broader conception of what constitutes Canada’s 
founding debates, and supports the work of other scholars who have identified 
an agrarian-commercial cleavage as a defining feature of nineteenth-century 
Canadian politics.
Résumé
Une grande partie de l’historiographie sur l’entrée de la Colombie-Britannique 
au sein de la Confédération en 1871 porte sur les motifs qui ont guidé la 
population de la Colombie-Britannique à vouloir s’unir au Canada. Cet 
article traite du débat entourant les conditions d’adhésion de la province, qui 
a eu lieu au Parlement du Canada et dans la presse canadienne de l’Est. Il 
reformule la question et la présente comme un conflit entre deux visions con-
tradictoires de l’avenir économique du Canada. Les partisans de l’adhésion 
de la Colombie-Britannique croient que l’accès au Pacifique transformerait le 
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nouveau dominion en une superpuissance commerciale. Quant aux opposants, 
ils voient cette Colombie-Britannique éloignée, montagneuse et peu densément 
peuplée comme un boulet, une région et une collectivité qui, contrairement à la 
Prairie de l’Ouest, ne pourront jamais se conformer à l’idéal agraire que sous-
tend leur conception du Canada. Un nouvel examen du débat sur les conditions 
d’adhésion qui ont eu lieu dans l’Est du Canada mène à une conception élargie 
de ce que sont les débats fondateurs du Canada. Cette vision rencontre les 
travaux d’autres chercheurs qui confèrent à la division agraire-commerciale un 
rôle déterminant de la politique canadienne du XIXe siecle. 
All hail Columbia! not least though last.” So the Rev. Aeneas McDonell Dawson opened his 1871 ode, “British Columbia Becomes a Province of 
the Canadian Confederation.” Over sixty-one lines, the Ottawa Roman Catholic 
priest — and brother of the well-known surveyor and expansionist, Simon 
James Dawson — extolled British Columbia’s resources and, more impor-
tantly, the position its acquisition would soon give the fledgling Dominion of 
Canada:
Extend’st thine arm of might where sets the sun,
Thy magic wand out o’er the western sea,
And lo! ere yet, thy work is well begun,
Vast continents and islands come to thee!
Cashmere and Thibet welcome tribute pay,
Her pent up treasures China willing pours;
Japan, from rest of earth no more astray,
And India come, their wealth changing with yours.
How blest thy favoured people in their store!
Earth’s richest theirs! Her pearls Arabia sends,
Her diamonds rare Golconda! Thine even more;
With these vie each eager clime that blends
Its lot with thine, and on thy ocean throne,
When greater than thyself, bright land, are gone,
Thou’lt reign Columbia, o’er the sea,
Hope, refuge, stronghold of the Free!1
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“
 1 Aeneas McDonell Dawson, “British Columbia Becomes a Province of the Canadian 
Confederation,” in his The North-west Territories and British Columbia (Ottawa: C.W. 
Mitchell, 1881), 218. On the Dawson family’s involvement in the Canadian expansionist move-
ment, see Doug Owram, Promise of Eden: The Canadian Expansionist Movement and the Idea 
of the West, 1856-1900 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980), 39.
Dawson was not alone in waxing poetic on the riches that Canada would accrue 
through its annexation of British Columbia. For Dominion Day 1869, a verse 
in the Belleville, Ontario, Daily Intelligencer eagerly anticipated the extension 
of the Dominion’s borders to the Pacific, “where the stormless waves have 
no angry crest / As they wash our barques to the gorgeous East.”2 Two years 
later, the Intelligencer, the organ of North Hastings MP and Conservative 
cabinet minister Mackenzie Bowell, supported unequivocally the Terms of 
Union admitting British Columbia to Confederation.3 The transcontinental 
railway promised as one of the Terms of Union would, the paper predicted in 
an editorial of 1 April 1871, “be certain to become the great artery for [the] 
great traffic” between China and Liverpool.4 In extolling the value of Asiatic 
commerce, Dawson and the Intelligencer positioned themselves firmly on 
one side of the fierce debate over the admission of British Columbia, a debate 
which provides an intriguing insight into the competing conceptions of the new 
Canadian nation that prevailed in the years immediately following 1867.
Historians have explained satisfactorily the motivations of British 
Columbians in seeking federation with Canada, but the eastern Canadian par-
liamentary and press discussion of British Columbia’s entry into Confederation 
has received considerably less scholarly attention.5 Writing in the late 1950s, 
Margaret Ormsby was aware of the opposition to the Terms of Union in the 
federal parliament, opposition she attributed to the financial commitments 
the Terms imposed on the young Dominion.6 She also suggested, in a brief, 
exploratory article on Canadian opinions of the Terms, that eastern Canadians 
believed in a “manifest destiny,” that led them to support the annexation of 
British Columbia.7 More recently, Jean Barman has described the parliamen-
tary debate on the Terms as anti-climactic, while Patricia Roy and John Herd 
Thompson acknowledge that the admission of British Columbia was part of 
a larger strategy of western development, and relate it to the expansionist 
programme of Toronto Globe editor George Brown, but do not examine the 
parliamentary debate.8 The authors of the national surveys have presented 
 2 “Land of the Maple Leaf,” Daily Intelligencer (Belleville) (3 July 1869), 4, col.1.
 3 Bowell was sole proprietor of the Intelligencer and thus its editorials reflected his political 
agenda P.B. Waite, “Sir Mackenzie Bowell,” Dictionary of Canadian Biography, <www.
biographi.ca/EN/ShowBio.asp?BioId=41353.htm>, (viewed 16 January 2007).
 4 “Admission of British Columbia,” Daily Intelligencer (1 April 1871), 2, col. 2-3.
 5 For British Columbia’s economic motivations, see Margaret Ormsby, British Columbia: A 
History (Toronto: Macmillan, 1958), 245-49, 257; Jean Barman, The West Beyond the West
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996), 96; Patricia Roy and John Herd Thompson, 
British Columbia: Land of Promises (Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 2005), 49-50.
 6 Margaret Ormsby, British Columbia, 249-50.
 7 Margaret Ormsby, “Canadian Opinion on British Columbia’s Entry into Confederation,” 
Report of the Okanagan Historical Society, 9 (1940): 35-7.
 8 Barman, The West Beyond the West, 97; Roy and Thompson, British Columbia: Land of 
Promises, 46, 49-50.
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the Terms of Union as a “Made-in-BC” solution to local economic problems, 
a solution eagerly endorsed by an expansionist parliament. Arthur Lower 
believed the admission of British Columbia to Confederation was significant 
chiefly in that it rested on the consent of the colony’s electorate; while W.L. 
Morton characterized the debate on the Terms in Parliament as a mere formality 
and Desmond Morton described the process of admitting British Columbia as 
“deceptively simple.”9
Though these historians have downplayed the significance of the debate, 
the proposed Terms of Union sharply divided the Canadian parliament and 
press. Even if, as Ormsby suggests, Canadians believed in a manifest destiny 
they disagreed on whether this destiny included British Columbia: the Pacific 
colony’s admission to the union was a considerably more divisive question for 
Canadian parliamentarians and journalists than the purchase of Rupert’s Land 
two years earlier, the Manitoba Act the previous year, or the Prince Edward 
Island Terms of Union two years later. Both government and opposition 
commentators recognized the British Columbia debate as one of the keenest 
fought battles in Canada’s short parliamentary history.10 The financial cost of 
the Terms, and of the promised railway in particular, figured prominently in 
the discussion, as Ormsby correctly noted. “It wouldn’t pay Canada to take 
many British Columbias at this price,” the Orangeville, Ontario, Sun opined, 
and most opponents of the Terms were inclined to agree.11 However, it is 
simplistic to characterize the debate as merely a conflict between government 
patriotism and opposition parsimony. Rather, the debate on the Terms was so 
contentious because it enflamed a pre-existing ideological conflict over the 
source of Canada’s future prosperity. For those, generally opposition Liberals 
or Reformers, whose conception of Canada was inspired by the agrarian ideal, 
distant, barren, and sparsely-settled British Columbia was an expensive and 
unnecessary liability, and its population failed to conform to their ideal of 
the upstanding yeoman-citizen. On the other side were those, including Rev. 
Dawson and the staff of the Belleville Intelligencer, who saw Canada’s future 
prosperity in its emergence as a nexus of international commerce. British 
Columbia, already rich in mineral wealth, was well situated to control the 
trade of the Pacific, and the construction of a Canadian Pacific railway would 
make Canada the entrepôt between Europe and the Orient. The division I posit 
 9 Arthur Lower, Colony to Nation: A History of Canada, 4th rev. ed. (Don Mills: Longmans, 
1964), 361; W. L. Morton, The Kingdom of Canada: A General History from Earliest Times,
2nd ed. (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1969), 338; Desmond Morton, A Short History of 
Canada, 5th ed. (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 2001), 104-5.
 10 Alexander Morris to Sir John A. Macdonald, 1 April 1871, cited in Donald Grant Creighton, 
John A. Macdonald, vol. 2 (Toronto: Macmillan, 1955), 105; “The British Columbia 
Resolutions,” Perth Courier (7 April 1871), 2, col. 3.
 11 “The resolutions to admit British Columbia … ” Sun (Orangeville) (6 April 1871), 2, col. 1.
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between the commercial and agrarian camps was not perfect. Commercialist 
Conservatives were certainly concerned about agriculture and frequently sought 
to reassure the opposition that parts of British Columbia were indeed arable. 
For their part, Liberal agrarians asserted, often formulaically, their commitment 
to the eventual consummation of a transcontinental union and even to the desir-
ability of expanding trade with Asia. Party allegiance certainly informed the 
final division on the Terms, but we should not dismiss partisanship as a mere 
antipathy between the “ins” and the “outs.” Rather, the parties that emerged in 
the decade after Confederation were themselves products of competing concep-
tions of Canada’s economic and political future. Ben Forster in particular has 
emphasized the importance of the tariff question, which divided farming and 
business interests, in defining the political landscape of the 1870s.12 That the 
debate on the Terms of Union was so acrimonious, especially when compared 
to the relative bi-partisanship that had typified discussions of other expansionist 
legislation, suggests an important role for the agrarian-commercial dichotomy 
generally, and the British Columbia debate specifically, in defining Canada’s 
early two-party system. Considering the Terms of Union debate as a contest 
between two competing conceptions of Canada’s ideal economic foundation 
accounts for the debate’s contentiousness.
In recasting the debate on the Terms of Union as a debate on the future of 
Canada as well as of British Columbia, this article contributes to a growing revi-
sionist historiography of Canadian Confederation, a literature that challenges 
long-accepted nationalist interpretations and presents a version of Confederation 
that is more problematic and more firmly situated within its multiple contexts. 
Ian McKay urges historians to consider Canada as a project in liberal state for-
mation, but, as he correctly observes, liberalism in nineteenth-century British 
North America resembled a “secular religion” rather than “an easily manipulated 
set of political ideals.”13 Thus, while none of the politicians and newspapermen 
considered in this study would have dared to challenge the key tenets of classi-
cal liberalism — individual liberty, at least for some, and its economic corollary, 
the free market — they differed considerably on the form the liberal state they 
envisioned might take. Several historians and political scientists have demon-
strated that the conceptions of British North America’s future that animated 
 12 Ben Forster, A Conjunction of Interests: Business, Politics, and Tariffs, 1825-1879 (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1986), 147-64. Jonathan Swainger also discusses the emergence 
of modern political parties during the 1870s, while S.J.R. Noel discusses a corollary to 
sharper ideological differentiation, the emergence of the centralized party apparatus. Jonathan 
Swainger, The Canadian Department of Justice and the Completion of Confederation, 1867-
78 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2000), 4-6; S.J.R. Noel, Patrons, 
Clients, Brokers: Ontario Society and Politics, 1791-1896 (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1990), 275-93.
 13 Ian McKay, “The Liberal Order Framework: A Prospectus for a Reconnaissance of Canadian 
History,” Canadian Historical Review 81, no. 4 (December 2000): 617-45.
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nineteenth-century politicians, newspapermen, and the public were rooted not 
only in economic self-interest but also in broader political and economic ideolo-
gies, with the dialectic between agrarian virtue and commercial avarice figuring 
prominently.14 The chief shortcoming of much of the recent Confederation 
historiography is that it does not carry its analysis beyond 1867 to include the 
admission of the latecomer provinces.15 Yet the question at least one contempo-
rary parliamentarian raised during the British Columbia Terms of Union debate 
is pertinent to a reassessment of the overall purpose of Confederation: why was 
an economically, and perhaps morally, bankrupt community of 10,000 white set-
tlers, perched precariously on the Pacific Slope, able to dictate terms to a more 
developed confederacy of four million?16 What did British Columbia offer the 
new Dominion such that a majority of Canadian parliamentarians was willing 
to ignore the opposition’s dire predictions of financial ruin? The debate on the 
British Columbia resolutions concerned not only the political future of a far-off 
colony, it also served as an opportunity for Canadians to discuss once again the 
nature and future of their “new nationality.”
The circumstances and provisions of the British Columbia Terms of Union 
are well known to most students of British Columbian and Canadian history. In 
the years following the union of British Columbia and Vancouver Island in 1866, 
rival factions emerged favouring either federation with Canada or annexation 
to the United States as a means of alleviating the depopulation and economic 
recession that followed the Cariboo gold rush. Meanwhile in Canada, Prime 
Minister Macdonald lobbied the Colonial Office to replace British Columbia’s 
anti-Confederationist Governor, Frederick Seymour, with someone more 
 14 Peter J. Smith, “The Ideological Origins of Canadian Confederation,” in Janet Ajzenstat 
and Peter J. Smith, eds., Canada’s Origins: Liberal, Tory, or Republican? (Ottawa: Carleton 
University Press, 1997), 47-78; Allan Greer, “Historical Roots of Canadian Democracy,” 
Journal of Canadian Studies 34, no.1 (Spring 1999): 7-26; Rusty Bitterman and Margaret 
McCallum, “When Private Rights Become Public Wrongs: Property and the State in Prince 
Edward Island in the 1830s,” in John McLaren, A.R. Buck, and Nancy E. Wright, eds., 
Despotic Dominion: Property Rights in British Settler Societies (Vancouver: University of 
British Columbia Press, 2005), 144-68. Greer is careful not to characterize the phenomenon he 
identifies as “agrarianism,” but his discussion of anti-corporate ideology in pre-Confederation 
Canada generally accords with Peter Smith’s thesis. 
 15 Canada’s Founding Debates is an exception, as its editors consider 1873, the year of Prince 
Edward’s Island’s entry, to be the date by which the work of Confederation was substantially 
complete. However, the book offers a narrow definition of the founding debates, consider-
ing for the latecomer provinces only the debates in the local legislatures. Jonathan Swainger 
argues for 1878 as the end-date for the Confederation period, but his focus is institutional 
developments in Ottawa, not territorial expansion and the admission of new provinces. Janet 
Azjenstat, et al., eds., Canada’s Founding Debates (Toronto: Stoddart, 1999), 1; Swainger, The
Canadian Department of Justice and the Completion of Confederation, 1867-78, 18.
 16 The politician in question was Quebec Senator John Sewall Sanborn. Canada. Senate, Debates
of the Senate, 1871 (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1975), 184.
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favourable to union.17 After Seymour’s sudden death at Bella Coola in June 
of 1869, the Colonial Office complied with Macdonald’s request and dispatched 
Anthony Musgrave, the Governor of Newfoundland, to Victoria. Frustrated 
with the divisions among the colony’s pro-Confederationists, Musgrave pre-
sented draft terms, as a motion of the Government, to the colony’s unicameral 
legislature during the winter of 1870.18 Upon the legislature’s ratification, with 
some minor modifications, of the Governor’s proposed Terms, a delegation 
of three under the de facto leadership of the colony’s Commissioner of Lands 
and Works, Joseph Trutch, travelled to Ottawa to negotiate with the Dominion 
government.19 Macdonald’s Quebec lieutenant and fellow leader of the great 
coalition, Sir George Etienne Cartier, acted for the Dominion, famously offer-
ing the British Columbians a transcontinental railway when only a wagon 
road had been requested.20 The revised Terms, ratified by the colonial legisla-
ture in January 1871, included a per capita subsidy for the maintenance of the 
provincial government; representation in Parliament by six members and three 
senators; and, most importantly and controversially, a promise to commence 
construction of a transcontinental railway within two years, for completion 
within ten.21 Trutch then returned to Ottawa, where British Columbia’s political 
future now lay in the hands of Canada’s parliamentarians.
Cartier introduced the address to the Queen embodying the British 
Columbia Terms of Union in the House of Commons on 28 March 1871.22 For 
 17 Public Record Office (hereafter PRO), CO 537, Colonial Office Secret Supplementary 
Correspondence, 1832-1922, /100, no. 204, John A. Macdonald to Sir John Young, 23 May 
1869.
 18 PRO, CO 60, British Columbia, Original Correspondence, 1858-1871, /38, no. 11, Anthony 
Musgrave to Sir John Young, 20 February 1870.
 19 The other two members were R.W.W. Carrall, a member of the legislature for Cariboo District, 
and Dr. John Sebastian Helmcken, a long-time colonial official and until lately an opponent of 
the Confederation scheme.
 20 Musgrave’s dispatches to the Colonial Office suggest that the British Columbians expected a 
railway long before Cartier offered one. The “noisiest” advocates of Confederation, Musgrave 
informed the Colonial Secretary on 5 April 1870, had led the people to expect a railroad as “a 
certain matter of course,” and that only when Canada’s offer was known would the colony’s 
political radicals cease to use the rosy prospect of Confederation for “weal political purposes.” 
PRO, CO 60, /38, no. 32, Musgrave to Lord Granville, 5 April 1870.
 21 Terms of Union, 1871 (Victoria, B.C.: Queen’s Printer, 1981). At the request of the Canadian 
government, Trutch agreed that British Columbia would not insist upon the ten-year deadline. 
At a dinner in Ottawa following the passage of the Terms through Parliament, he reassured 
his hosts that British Columbia had not made a “Jewish bargain,” and being now part of the 
Canadian body politic, the province would be loathe to demand its “pound of flesh.” British
Columbia and the Pacific Railway: Complimentary Dinner to the Hon. Mr. Trutch, Surveyor-
General of British Columbia, given at the Russell House, Ottawa, on Monday, 10th April, 
1871, (Montreal: Gazette, 1871), 9.
 22 Macdonald was in Washington as part of the British delegation negotiating a new fisheries 
treaty with the Americans. The absence of references in his papers suggests that he had little 
involvement in the British Columbia debate.
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the governing party, the admission of British Columbia was simply the cul-
mination of the road to nationhood embarked upon at Charlottetown in 1864. 
Cartier reminded the house that the former Colonial Secretary, Sir Edward 
Bulwer Lytton, had predicted as early as 1858 that the colonies of British North 
America would one day form a united empire from the Atlantic to the Pacific, 
and he marvelled at the speed with which Lytton’s prediction had been accom-
plished. The progress of the Dominion evoked favourable comparisons with 
the American experience: expansion to the Pacific had taken the Americans 
six decades, Cartier remarked, but Canada had accomplished it in less than 
ten years, indeed in less than five.23 Canada’s development ought to mirror 
or even overtake that of the United States, for it was the new Dominion’s 
duty and destiny to establish a British empire in North America.24 If a trans-
continental empire was the “ulterior object” of Confederation, as Postmaster 
General Alexander Campbell suggested on introducing the Terms of Union in 
the Senate on 3 April 1871, certainly the admission of British Columbia was 
integral to the success of the project.25
The supporters of the Terms of Union looked beyond expansion to the 
Pacific. Cartier’s speech only briefly alluded to the purpose for which Canada 
should acquire a Pacific seaboard. English history, he suggested, demonstrated 
the “splendid position” that could be achieved through maritime power, and 
access to the Pacific was critical “if ever this Dominion was to be a powerful 
nation in the future.”26 In conversation with the British Columbia delegates, 
Cartier had expressed his belief that Quebec, as a manufacturing centre, and 
British Columbia, as the inlet for the Pacific trade, would become the most 
important sections of the Dominion, and his Montreal organ, La Minerve, was 
quick to develop the theme of maritime commercial power.27 The day after the 
British Columbia resolutions were introduced in the House, La Minerve reprinted 
its editorial of 26 May 1869, when Parliament had contemplated the purchase of 
Rupert’s Land. The editorial’s imagery echoed that of Dawson’s poem:
 23 Canada. House of Commons, Debates of the House of Commons, 1871 (Ottawa: Queen’s 
Printer, 1871), 663. Newspapers favourable to the Terms also recalled Lytton’s prediction. 
“After the vote …, ” Daily News (Kingston) (31 March 1871), 2, col. 3; “The Pacific Railway,” 
Times (Ottawa) (6 April 1871), 2, col. 1.
 24 See, for example, the speeches of Col. John Hamilton Gray, Hector-Louis Langevin, and 
William Miller. Canada. House of Commons, Debates, 1871, 692, 700; Canada. Senate, 
Debates, 1871, 179.
 25 Canada. Senate, Debates, 1871, 151-2.
 26 Canada. House of Commons, Debates, 1871, 663. 
 27 Quoted in John Sebastian Helmcken, Dorothy Blakey Smith, ed., The Reminiscences of Doctor 
John Sebastian Helmcken (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1975), 358.
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Le Nord-Ouest n’est aujourd’hui qu’un vaste désert et la 
solitude est la seule compagne de cette nature sauvage; mais 
attendons. Le Nord-Ouest, c’est la grandeur et la richesse, 
c’est l’empire du commerce; c’est le dernier trait-d’union 
entre l’Europe et l’Asie; c’est le chemin de l’or australien 
des shawls, du cashmere [sic], des diamants de Golconde, des 
soies de la Chine, des épices du Malabar et des Moluques, 
etc. Une immense activité mettra un jour Victoria en rapport 
journalier avec Montréal et les nations, pour trafiquer, dev-
ront débarquer chez nous.28
The future lay with trade, the editorial continued, and the trade routes to the 
Orient had long determined the fate of western nations. Victoria, a thousand 
miles closer to China and two thousand miles closer to Japan, would soon over-
shadow San Francisco as Asia’s port of entry just as Alexandria had displaced 
Petra, Tyre, Palmyra, and Constantinople.29 Le Courrier de Saint-Hyacinthe 
also believed that the Pacific Railway would become the favoured route to 
Asia, and, though less effusive in its support for the Terms than its Montreal 
and St-Hyacinthe contemporaries, Le Nouveau monde of Quebec City also 
stated that the admission of British Columbia offered to Canada “l’espérance 
d’obtenir le contrôle d’une partie du commerce de l’Asie avec l’Europe.”30
Conservative MPs and newspapers from Ontario also looked forward to 
Canada’s emergence as the world’s leading commercial power. The member 
for Russell County, Dr. James Alexander Grant, spoke in terms very similar 
to La Minerve. Like the nations of classical antiquity and more recent com-
mercial centres, British Columbia was destined to become the new centre of 
Asian trade. When he considered the geography of the Strait of Georgia basin, 
Grant saw a series of harbours “set apart by a special Providence as a depot for 
the shipping of the East, and as an entrance to the great highway of all nations 
across the British American continent.”31 The Ottawa Free Press suggested 
that the construction of a “British Pacific Road” was “not only essential to 
the union of British Columbia, but to the [securing] to this country that trade 
with the real Orient which its position entitles it to expect, and which will be 
of more value than it is now possible to estimate.”32 The national prosperity 
that Oriental trade would bring was worth the price the British Columbians 
 28 “La Colombie et le chemin du Pacifique,” La Minerve (Montreal) (29 March 1871), 2, col. 
2-5.
 29 Ibid.
 30 “La division qui a eu lieu …, ” Courrier de Saint-Hyacinthe (11 April 1871), 3, col. 3-4;
“Annexion de la Colombie anglaise,” Le Nouveau monde (Quebec) (3 April 1871), 1, col. 3.
 31 Canada. House of Commons, Debates, 1871, 675.
 32 “British Columbia in the House of Commons and Senate,” Free Press (Ottawa) (31 March 
1871), 2, col. 1.
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demanded. Equally enthused was Alexander Morris. The Inland Revenue min-
ister and member for Lanark South had been among the earliest proponents of 
transcontinental Confederation. His 1858 lecture on “The Hudson’s Bay and 
Pacific Territories” foresaw the emergence of a “Great Britannic Empire of the 
North” that would become the thoroughfare for the trade of China and Japan.33
In the Commons in 1871, Morris reiterated his contention that a transcontinen-
tal railway would serve not only to unite the new Dominion, but would also 
ensure Canada’s commercial supremacy.34
For some years Maritimers had eagerly anticipated that the trade of the 
Orient flowing into British North America through British Columbia would 
flow out through Halifax and St John.35 Cartier had predicted that the mer-
chant communities of the lower provinces would make common cause with 
the British Columbians, and indeed many Maritime MPs and newspapers came 
out in favour of the British Columbia resolutions.36 The member for the City 
of St John, former New Brunswick premier Sir Samuel Leonard Tilley, spoke 
to the commercial benefits for eastern Canadian ports. He argued that, unlike 
a railway that ended at the eastern foothills of the Rocky Mountains, as some 
in the opposition proposed, an interoceanic line would capture not only local 
but also through traffic, and this trade could only benefit the terminal cities 
of the St. Lawrence and the Atlantic seaboard.37 Another maritime Father of 
Confederation, Sir Charles Tupper of Nova Scotia, argued that the Canadian 
railway, unlike the American, would travel through fertile territory and would 
reduce the journey between China and Great Britain by 1000 miles.38 Maritime 
newspapers sympathetic to the federal ministry also saw the Canadian national 
destiny in global terms. “We have entered upon an era of great public works,” 
predicted the Halifax Daily Reporter, “all tending to give British North America 
its true position in the British Empire as the great central link uniting the three 
Islands that constitute the ‘Motherland’ with those great dependencies of India, 
Australasia and New Zealand and forming the great highway over which traf-
fic and travel to and from these dependencies shall pass by the shortest and 
 33 Alexander Morris, Nova Britannia: or Our New Canadian Dominion Foreshadowed (Toronto: 
Hunter, Rose and Co., 1884), 88.
 34 Canada. House of Commons, Debates, 1871, 714.
 35 An early example is T.T. Vernon Smith’s 1859 lecture before the St. John Mechanics’ Institute, 
which enumerated the commodities of the Orient that would flow over a proposed transconti-
nental network of railways and waterways tributary to the New Brunswick port. T. T. Vernon 
Smith, The Pacific Railway, and the claims of Saint John, New Brunswick, to be the Atlantic 
terminus read before the Mechanics’ Institute of Saint John, February 7, 1859 (St John: W.L. 
Avery, 1859), 19-20, 28-9.
 36 Quoted in Helmcken, Reminiscences, 358.
 37 Canada. House of Commons, Debates, 1871, 668, 671. One Anglophone Quebec news-
paper also noted the prosperity the railway would give to that city. ”The position of the 
Opposition...,” Quebec Mercury (31 March 1871), 2, col. 2.
 38 Canada. House of Commons, Debates, 1871, 757.
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speediest route.”39 The Halifax British Colonist also noted the importance of 
the railway for imperial unity and trade, and believed that Britain would sub-
sidize the railway as both a military and commercial undertaking. British and 
Canadian subsidies would encourage investment, and the completed railway 
would “advance these young countries to the foremost position among the com-
mercial communities of the world.”40
In the upper chamber, senators reiterated both rosy visions of Canada’s 
commercial ascendance and dire predictions of what might transpire were the 
Terms rejected. Peter Mitchell of New Brunswick foresaw Canada’s emergence 
as a great maritime power within a decade, while James Skead of Ontario 
warned that if British Columbia were not admitted on the Terms presented, 
Canada would lose access to “the carrying trade of China and Japan.”41 It was 
Nova Scotia senator William Miller, however, who presented the most detailed 
articulation of the commercialist view of the British Columbia Terms of Union. 
In the longest speech delivered during the three-day senate debate on the Terms, 
Miller suggested that, while British Columbia’s own resources were consider-
able, the colony’s greatest contribution to Canada and the Empire would be the 
opening of a British Pacific seaboard to Asian commerce. Like James Grant 
and La Minerve, Miller looked to history to illustrate the benefits of commerce 
to a national economy. Citing an “able” yet anonymous author, he observed 
that since antiquity Oriental commodities had been a source of great wealth 
to the communities that trafficked in them. The transcontinental thoroughfare 
would be of particular value to the Maritimes. With its mighty capital poised 
to become “the great Atlantic depot of the trade of the East,” Miller speculated 
that the name of Nova Scotia might one day stand alongside Phoenicia, Rome, 
and Arabia. It was to secure the trade of the Orient that Canada undertook its 
“especial mission” to unite British North America from coast to coast.42
While the commercialists shared many common ideas, they adapted their 
approaches to their various audiences. Miller’s speech was calculated to appeal 
not only to Maritimers but also to imperialists, for he saw the emergence of 
Canada as the entrepôt of the Indies in imperial as well as national terms. He 
was supported in this view of the railway as an imperial necessity by the writ-
ings of Viscount Bury, the British MP and former Canadian Superintendent of 
Indian Affairs, who had written extensively on the economics of railways and 
believed that British trade with the Pacific must be carried through the North 
American colonies.43 La Minerve had also cited Bury, but the Montreal paper 
recognized the necessity of making the prospect of a transcontinental empire 
 39 “Marching On,” Daily Reporter and Times (Halifax) (1 April 1871), 2, col. 1.
 40 “Our Ottawa Letter,” British Colonist (Halifax) (6 April 1871), 2, col. 3.
 41 Canada. Senate, Debates, 1871, 243-4.
 42 Ibid., 179.
 43 Quoted in Ibid., 177.
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attractive to French Canadians. 44 In its editorial of 3 April, after the Commons 
had ratified the resolutions, La Minerve not only reiterated its faith that Canada 
would dominate the trade of the Indies, but also credited French Canadians with 
having originated and fulfilled the idea of a transcontinental nation. La Salle, 
Beauharnois, and Varennes had proposed it as early as the seventeenth century, 
and it was Cartier, “un premier ministre canadien,” and “une courageuse pha-
lange de Canadiens-Français intelligents,” who had ensured that the idea would 
reach fruition.45 Cartier himself linked the admission of British Columbia 
with the national aspirations of French Canada in a speech at a banquet for 
Joseph Trutch.46 One Anglophone paper melded La Minerve’s French Canadian 
interpretation with the British imperialist view. According to the Ottawa Times,
the railway was a significant imperial concern, insofar as it would strengthen 
Great Britain’s military and commercial position in the Pacific. However, 
in recounting Cartier’s speech at Trutch’s banquet, the paper deemed it notewor-
thy that the opening of a western route to Asia would be the work of a “lineal 
descendant” of Jacques Cartier, who had also sought “Oriental splendour” up 
the St. Lawrence.47 In the centuries-old quest for the Northwest Passage, the 
commercialists found common ground for French and English Canadians.
La Minerve’s appeals to see the admission of British Columbia as the cul-
mination of a long history of Canadian progress were not, of course, shared by 
all French Canadian commentators. A rival Montreal paper, Le Franc-Parleur,
argued that in considering only the commercial side of the Terms, the govern-
ment would increase the national debt and thus compromise Canada’s future.48
In the House of Commons, the most vocal French Canadian opponent of the 
Terms of Union was Henri-Gustave Joly de Lotbinière, ironically the man 
Wilfrid Laurier would later appoint as British Columbia’s Lieutenant-Governor. 
Ever fond of illustrating his contentions with the fables of Lafontaine, Joly 
compared the Canadian expansionists with the frog who, aspiring to be as 
large as an ox, inhaled air until he exploded.49 He ridiculed in particular the 
 44 “La Colombie et le chemin du Pacifique,” La Minerve (Montreal) (29 March 1871), 2, col. 
2-5.
 45 “L’admission de la Colombie Anglaise,” La Minerve (Montreal) (3 April 1871), 2, col. 3-4.
 46 British Columbia and the Pacific Railway, 4.
 47 “‘The Star of Empire Glitters in the West’,” Times (Ottawa) (13 April 1871), 2, col. 1-2.
 48 Adolphe Ouimet, “La Colombie Anglaise et le chemin de fer du Pacifique,” Le Franc-Parleur
(Montreal) (6 April 1871), 314-16.
 49 In the Confederation Debates in the Canadian provincial legislature, Joly had used a 
Lafontaine fable about an overburdened donkey to draw attention to the tax burden the union 
of the colonies would impose. Lafontaine’s frog and ox fable was also paraphrased by at 
least three western Ontario newspapers in their coverage of the British Columbia debate. 
Canada. House of Commons, Debates, 1871, 696; Azjenstat, et al., eds., Canada’s Founding 
Debates, 138-9; “British Columbia,” Owen Sound Advertiser (6 April 1871), 2, col.2; “An 
Outrageous Proposition,” Norfolk Reformer (Simcoe) (6 April 1871), 2, col. 1; “The Dominion 
Parliament,” Weekly Dispatch (St Thomas) (6 Apr 1871), 2, col. 1-2.
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notion that Canada might become a highway to Asia. “It was very fortunate,” 
he observed sarcastically, “[that] the Pacific made a boundary to the land to be 
annexed, although it was true [that] China and Japan were beyond, and perhaps 
the Pacific might yet be made a Canadian sea.”50
Joly was joined by English Canadians in dismissing the notion of a 
Canadian empire built on commerce. The Toronto Globe acknowledged that 
Canadians were interested in Eastern trade and were therefore willing to 
offer prudent and economical inducements to British Columbia.51 Others in 
the English Canadian opposition were less charitable. For Montreal Centre 
MP Thomas Workman, the notion that merchants would send Oriental goods 
over the Pacific Railway was ridiculous because long distance travel by rail 
would damage fragile items.52 Robert Dickey, a Nova Scotia senator, gener-
ally supportive of the British Columbia resolutions, had to concede that while 
some light luxury goods might travel from Asia to Europe through Canada, 
most commodities would continue to travel by sea.53 Quebec senator John 
Sewall Sanborn used the proponents’ classical illustrations to a different end: 
as Alexander the Great had found eventually that there was no more world 
left to conquer, so it would be for Canada’s would-be expansionists. When 
Sanborn recalled Lord Elgin’s observation that “a Yankee would not be con-
tent with the Garden of Eden but would go westward,” he alluded to another 
contention of the opposition, that expansion to the Pacific to rival the United 
States was not only economically untenable, it was also un-Canadian. William 
Miller might profess that Canadian expansionism had goals more just and more 
noble than mere self-aggrandizement, but both Thomas Workman and Ontario 
Senator William McMaster saw in the resolutions and the speeches of their 
proponents a “spread-eagleism” more characteristic of American than Canadian 
nationalism.54 The Norfolk Reformer ironically alluded to Jonathan Sewall’s 
oft-quoted motto of American manifest destiny, “No pent up Utica contracts 
our powers,” in its denunciation of the imperial delusions of the government. 
The Bowmanville, Ontario, Canadian Statesman compared the admission of 
British Columbia to the recent American purchase of Alaska, both examples 
of “‘extension of territory’ mania of the worst form.”55 In Loyalist Ontario, no 
 50 Canada. House of Commons, Debates, 1871, 696.
 51 “The British Columbia Resolutions,” Globe (Toronto) (30 March 1871), 2, col. 1.
 52 Canada. House of Commons, Debates, 1871, 723.
 53 Canada. Senate, Debates, 1871, 200.
 54 Canada. House of Commons, Debates, 1871, 723; Canada. Senate, Debates, 1871, 247.
 55 “No Pent Up Utica,” Norfolk Reformer (Simcoe) (6 April 1871), 2, col. 3; “The rulers at 
Ottawa...,” Canadian Statesman (Bowmanville) (6 April 1871), 2, col. 1. Sewall’s 1778 
epilogue to Joseph Addison’s play, Cato, juxtaposed Cato the Younger’s opposition to the 
excesses of Julius Caesar, which was Addison’s setting, with the new American Republic’s 
resistence to the tyranny of Great Britain. It concluded that Washington might aspire to an 
empire encompassing “the whole boundless continent,” unlike Cato, confined to his “pent-
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comment against a policy could be so damning as the suggestion that it reeked 
of Americanism. 
Opponents of the Terms argued that the ministry’s American precedents 
were not apt because British Columbia and the American West were at different 
stages of development. Senator David Wark of New Brunswick observed that 
there was already a substantial population and a rich economy in California 
before the Americans contemplated a railway.56 David Mills, the Liberal mem-
ber for Bothwell, Ontario, raised the same objection, as did the secessionist 
Halifax Morning Chronicle.57 To the opposition, British Columbia lacked a 
critical feature necessary for nation-building, namely the presence of, or even 
the potential to attract, a significant and permanent population. The mining 
colony’s population was composed largely of transient sojourners, who rarely 
stayed long in one location and felt no compunction against quitting British 
Columbia when the mines ceased to be profitable. For Canadians, as for others, 
mining was a valuable pursuit insofar as it garnered attention for new fields for 
colonization, but it was not in itself a viable economic foundation for a new 
nation.58 A railway intended to carry through-traffic was a purely speculative 
venture and no more a suitable basis for national stability than gold mining. 
Agriculture alone was the basis for lasting prosperity. The Canada the opposi-
tion envisioned was a nation of thrifty yeoman farmers, with a fiscally prudent 
legislature constituted strictly upon the principle of representation by popula-
tion to protect them from the excesses of corrupt ministers and monopolistic 
corporations. Richard Cartwright, for example, recalled in his memoirs that 
the independent farmers of Ontario “answered very nearly to the class of old 
English yeomen,” as the epitome of civic virtue and the bulwark of democracy 
against the onslaught of urban commercial oligarchy, and others in the opposi-
tion also commented on the salutary influence of the freeholding agricultural 
  up Utica.” The Reformer also quoted from Fitz-Greene Halleck’s popular poem, “Marco 
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 56 Canada. Senate, Debates, 1871, 224.
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class on national political life.59 When British Columbia and its Terms and 
potential were assessed according to this conception of Canada, the Pacific 
colony was everything the new Dominion was not.
The alleged agricultural sterility of British Columbia underpinned much 
of the opposition to the Terms of Union, and the proponents of the resolutions 
worked vigorously to refute it. Although the commercialists had presented the 
British American West as a “passage to India,” they also subscribed to the sec-
ond great myth of the west, the myth of the “Garden of the World.”60 Lacking 
personal experience of the colony, politicians on both sides of the floor drew 
on anecdotal and published sources for their information about the colony’s 
productivity. On the basis of Trutch’s reports, Alexander Morris stated that 
British Columbia encompassed almost as much agricultural land as Ontario.61
Nova Scotia senator Frank Smith contended that the colony was as fertile as 
Ireland, though he did not provide a source.62 Peter Mitchell suggested that the 
proposed Bute Inlet route would pass for three hundred miles through a plateau 
so bountiful that horses could survive through the winter without fodder.63
Others sidestepped the issue of British Columbia’s fertility to emphasize its 
other resources. Cartier himself in introducing the resolutions suggested that 
the land offered to the railway company would be “not merely agricultural land, 
but mineral land,” and Le Journal des Trois-Rivières noted the colony’s mineral 
and timber wealth, citing Trutch as its source.64 The Ottawa Free Press wrote
of British Columbia’s “fertile valleys,” but also predicted that the new province 
 59 Cartwright, Reminiscences, 340-1. For other appeals to the yeoman myth from opponents 
of the Terms of Union, see Edward Blake, “To Knights of Labour,” in Dominion Election 
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would become an important market for Canadian grain.65 Senator James Ferrier 
of Quebec drew attention to the colony’s mines and fisheries, while William 
Miller, acknowledging the “uneven ground,” spoke of rich supplies of coal 
and timber, as well as the prospect of a thriving trade in fish between British 
Columbia and Catholic South America.66 In addition to its strategic importance 
for the Pacific trade, the commercialists saw in British Columbia the resources 
necessary for diverse economic pursuits, including agriculture.
For the opposition, however, the lack of agriculture loomed large. The 
member for Lambton County, Ontario, and future Liberal prime minister, 
Alexander Mackenzie, contended that the Pacific Slope was barren, a posi-
tion corroborated by the colony’s dependence on the neighbouring American 
states for its food supply.67 In addition to trade statistics printed in the ses-
sional papers, opponents of the Terms drew, albeit selectively, on the reports 
of Canadians who had first-hand knowledge of the far West. David Christie 
related to the Senate his recent personal conversation with Malcolm Cameron, 
the Sarnia politician and newspaperman who had visited the Pacific colonies in 
1862. Cameron’s initial reports from British Columbia to eastern newspapers 
had been favourable, emphasizing the colony’s mineral wealth and dismissing 
Canadians who had returned home prematurely and now denigrated British 
Columbia’s resources as “not worthy sons of the men who made Canada.”68
Indeed, like the Macdonald-Cartier government six years later, Cameron pre-
dicted in an 1865 speech that political unification of British North America 
would make Canada the great commercial emporium of the world.69 However, 
as Christie emphasized, Cameron had been only lukewarm in his assessment 
of the colony’s agricultural potential. While the demand created by the mining 
communities ensured prosperity for some farmers, Cameron remarked that “the 
country was never intended for a purely agricultural one.”70 In his conversation 
with Senator Christie nine years after his visit to the west, he stated that the 
only fertile lands in British Columbia were prone to flooding, while the uplands 
were sterile deserts of bunch grass. Moreover, Christie recalled, Canadian set-
tlers in British Columbia had dismissed as overly optimistic even Cameron’s 
most cautious assessments of British Columbia’s agricultural fertility.71
 65 “The Wealth of British Columbia,” Free Press (Ottawa) (13 April 1871), 1, col. 6-7.
 66 Canada. Senate, Debates, 1871, 172-3, 227.
 67 Canada. House of Commons, Debates, 1871, 672.
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To the opponents of the Terms of Union, the government’s suggestions 
that British Columbia would attract settlers, and consequently that sales of land 
in the province could finance railway construction, were absurd. “If you could 
not derive a revenue from the fertile lands [of Ontario and Quebec], how could 
you expect to do so from this miserable region of the West?” inquired Senator 
Benjamin Seymour. Timothy Warren Anglin, member for Gloucester County, 
New Brunswick, made much the same point, asking why settlers who would not 
take lands in Ontario would choose to settle in a “sea of mountains” where “it 
would be difficult to find those vast tracts of fertile country spoken of by hon. 
Members opposite.”72 In Anglin’s view, perpetual landslides and avalanches 
would frustrate efforts to construct railways and farms in British Columbia’s 
“sterile mountains” and gloomy canyons.73 Another New Brunswicker, Senator 
William Hunter Odell, echoed these doubts, questioning why British Columbia, 
so attractive a country in the eyes of the government, had hitherto failed to 
attract settlers.74 He pointed to the difficulties of clearing land, the exhaustion of 
the gold mines, and the improbability of a timber industry given that conifers as 
large as those on the west coast would splinter in falling.75 For Quebec nation-
alists Antoine-Aime Dorion and Luc Letellier de St. Just, the money necessary 
to build “a railway in a barren and mountainous country” would be better spent 
to improve transportation networks in the proven agricultural districts of the 
St Lawrence Basin.76 Given that even the Grand Trunk Railway, which passed 
through settled and civilized country, had failed to turn a profit, Le Franc-
Parleur thought it easy to predict “la carrière brillante du ‘grand Pacifique,’ 
sillonnant les forêts et les déserts.”77 The Huntingdon Canadian Gleaner, which 
served the Anglophone population of southwestern Quebec and whose editor, 
Robert Sellar, was certainly no friend of French Canadian nationalism, had to 
 72 Canada. House of Commons, Debates, 1871, 718, 720. The “sea of mountains” characteriza-
tion was, of course, made famous by Edward Blake in his “Aurora speech” of 1874. While 
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concur with the judgement of Dorion and Letellier. “A road of such a length 
can never pay during this century as a commercial speculation,” the Gleaner
wrote of the Pacific railway, “and no man would exchange a hundred acres of 
land on the banks of the St Lawrence for a thousand at the base of the Rocky 
Mountains.”78 Without an agricultural base, critics of the Terms of Union feared 
British Columbia would never enjoy significant population growth. Just as any 
Ontario county west of Hamilton was more productive than British Columbia, 
so the population of British Columbia was, and was likely to remain, smaller 
than that of the larger Canadian counties.79
The small size of the present and projected population of British Columbia 
was a significant concern for opponents of the Terms. The resolutions estimated 
British Columbia’s population at 60,000 for the purposes of determining its per 
capita subsidy and parliamentary representation, and, accordingly, granted the 
province six members in the House of Commons. However, if British Columbia 
did have a population of 60,000, even by the most generous estimates only one 
quarter of that population was white, the rest comprising Aboriginal peoples and 
Chinese.80 The British Columbia government was most concerned about the 
population estimate as it affected the subsidy.81 The Canadian press and parlia-
ment, however, were most concerned about the apparent violation of the principle 
of representation by population. To Ontarians in particular, the constitutional 
violation, which followed a dangerous precedent established by the Manitoba 
Act the previous year, threatened to reignite sectional hostility.82 The Goderich 
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Huron Signal calculated that British Columbia would have one member of parlia-
ment for every 2,000 white citizens, while Ontario had but one member for every 
20,000 citizens.83 In his memoirs, Richard Cartwright, the member for Lennox, 
speculated that in admitting British Columbia the ministry had sought to com-
pensate for projected electoral losses in the East with new, safely Conservative 
seats in the far West.84 Grit papers in London and Simcoe also worried that the 
new provinces were intended as nothing more than rotten boroughs the gov-
erning party could use to overwhelm the new-found influence of Ontario.85 In 
Parliament, member after member rose to challenge the representation formula.86
In the Senate, Letellier also criticized the proposal to give British Columbia three 
senators, though Jean-Charles Chapais quickly pointed out that senate representa-
tion was sectional rather than proportional, and even Alexander Mackenzie was 
willing to allow some departure from the letter of the constitution in this area.87
Just below the surface of these impassioned defences of the principle 
of representation by population was a disagreement between opponents and 
supporters of the resolutions over the basis of political participation. For 
the commercialists, the preconditions for political representation were very 
different from those assumed by the opposition, as Governor Musgrave’s jus-
tification for the proposed representation formula indicates. In a letter to Sir 
John Young, the Canadian Governor-General, explaining British Columbia’s 
terms, Musgrave noted that a small population and small production rendered 
the colony dependent on imports. Such imports yielded greater customs rev-
enue per capita than anywhere in the older provinces. Musgrave therefore 
argued that British Columbia’s population estimate should be based upon the 
annual customs revenue in eastern Canada; as British Columbia had collected 
about $350,000 in customs duties the previous year, and as Canada’s customs 
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revenues were $2.75 per capita, the colony’s consuming public was worth as 
much to the Dominion treasury as 120,000 eastern Canadians. Thus, the exact 
population was irrelevant, and British Columbia should “come into the Union 
with the privileges, as she relinquished the Revenue, of 120,000 of the popula-
tion of the Dominion.”88 While Musgrave’s despatch was printed in the 1871 
Canadian Sessional Papers, making it available to proponents and opponents of 
the Terms alike, Canadian politicians were reluctant to follow his logic, arguing 
instead that immigration would quickly correct British Columbia’s excess rep-
resentation, or that competing local interests within the colony demanded more 
than one member of parliament.89 However, at least one Ontario newspaper 
favourable to the Terms did agree with Musgrave that wealth, area, and “varied 
interests” should be given weight alongside population when determining par-
liamentary entitlements.90
What Musgrave advocated, and the Terms embodied in fact if not in spirit, 
was political representation based not on population or property ownership but 
on consumption and taxation, that is, on participation in a commercial rather than 
an agricultural economy. Indeed, Musgrave had informed the Colonial Office 
in 1870 of the impossibility of a property qualification in British Columbia, 
and the British Columbia Government Act of that year enshrined in law his 
recommendation that the franchise be extended to all male British subjects 
irrespective of property ownership.91 For the opposition, however, permanent 
landed settlement, almost certainly agricultural, was the only basis for political 
participation. In their view, agriculture determined not only the size but also the 
moral quality of a population.92 Governor Musgrave himself gave the opposition 
ample evidence that the nature of British Columbia’s economy indeed produced 
moral degradation. “The white inhabitants,” Musgrave had written to Governor-
General Young, “are chiefly male adults of wasteful and expensive habits,” and 
the Canadian opposition seized upon this characterization.93 For David Christie, 
 88 PRO, CO 60, /38, no. 11, Musgrave to Sir John Young, 20 February 1870.
 89 Canada. Parliament, Sessional Papers (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1871), no.18, 2; Canada. House 
of Commons, Debates, 1871, 661-2, 692; Canada. Senate, Debates, 1871, 153, 228, 259.
 90 “The Parliamentary Representation of British Columbia,” Times (Ottawa) (31 March 1871), 2, 
col. 2.
 91 PRO, CO 60, /38, no. 20, Musgrave to Granville, 23 Feb 1870. 
 92 Adele Perry argues that British Columbia’s social and racial composition challenged Victorian 
moral ideals, and she suggests that the failure of the colony to evolve from a mining outpost 
into an agricultural society perpetuated its moral marginalization. Adele Perry, On the Edge of 
Empire: Gender, Race, and the Making of British Columbia, 1849-1871 (Toronto: University 
of Toronto Press, 2001), 3-19. 
 93 PRO, CO 60, /38, no. 11, Musgrave to Young, 20 February 1870. Musgrave also believed the 
people of British Columbia were as yet unfit for responsible government, and a significant 
portion of the Confederation debate in the British Columbia Legislature was spent interpreting 
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it was incomprehensible that a population whose own Governor described them 
so should enjoy so disproportionate a parliamentary representation.94 Benjamin 
Seymour of Ontario thought the representation provisions an insult to the people 
of his own province, who more closely fit the agrarian ideal of citizenship. 
“I cannot see the fairness,” Seymour told the Senate, “in giving some 10,000 
whites, represented as being of wasteful and extravagant habits, three members 
in the senate whilst Ontario, with two millions, representing a sturdy yeomanry, 
an industrious population, not a people of wasteful and extravagant habits, has 
only twenty-four members in the same branch.”95 A people so un-Canadian in 
their morality were only fit for an un-Canadian form of government. William 
Macdougall, the Member for Lanark North, whose own brother had experienced 
disappointment in the British Columbia gold fields, made this clear when he 
stated that “it was absurd that the future destiny of [British Columbia] was in the 
hands of a few adventurers who were mining there.”96 Senator Sanborn thought 
it humiliating that “a country like [Canada], enjoying responsible Government 
and representative institutions for many years — with a superior system of col-
leges and schools, with a territory and resources in a high stage of development,” 
should have terms dictated to it by a despotism such as British Columbia.97 For 
those opponents of the Terms who did accept the principle of extending the 
Dominion’s boundaries to the Pacific, the American model of territorial admin-
istration was preferable, both economically and politically, to the admission of 
full provinces in the West. Inexpensive to administer and represented only by 
a non-voting delegate, territories were only admitted to statehood when they 
reached a certain population threshold and a concomitant level of infrastructure 
development and political maturity.98
If the opposition saw the white population as degraded by their eco-
nomic circumstances, they were even more indignant at the suggestion that 
Aboriginal peoples be included in the population for the purpose of calculat-
ing subsidies and parliamentary representation. This was further evidence of 
the government’s intention to undermine representation by population; why 
else, the opponents wondered, should British Columbia’s Indians be included 
in the population estimates if Ontario’s were not?99 Musgrave acknowledged 
that the population included “a large number of Indians,” but he also noted 
 94 Canada. Senate, Debates, 1871, 252.
 95 Ibid., 220.
 96 Canada. House of Commons, Debates, 1871, 725; “British Columbia: Letter from a Toronto 
Miner,” Daily Leader (Toronto) (20 November 1862), 2, col. 4.
 97 Canada. Senate, Debates, 1871, 184. Sanborn’s characterization of British Columbia as a 
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 98 Canada. House of Commons, Debates, 1871, 666; Canada. Senate, Debates, 1871, 251-2.
 99 Canada. House of Commons, Debates, 1871, 672, 698.
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that they were consumers.100 If one accepted his contention that contribution 
to revenue was an appropriate basis for representation, and if the Aboriginal 
population participated in a taxable market economy, then there was, ironically 
enough, no contradiction in including Aboriginal peoples in the representation 
formula.101 Proponents of the Terms echoed Musgrave’s assessment of the 
colony’s native peoples. Both Cartier and Public Works Minister Hector-Louis 
Langevin characterized the Aboriginal population as civilized subjects engaged 
in useful occupations.102 The opposition, however, mocked the government’s 
presentation of the Aboriginal population. According to Cartier, the Canadian 
Gleaner reported sarcastically, the native inhabitants were “not wild Indians . . . 
but Indians like those of Caughnawaga.”103 Senator Christie suggested instead 
that the Indians in question were “perfectly worthless,” and, according to Arthur 
Harvey’s Statistical Account of British Columbia, contributed nothing to the 
labour force.104 The most damning assessment of British Columbia’s racial com-
position came, however, from the Halifax Morning Chronicle, which warned 
that “the ‘fellow countrymen’ we would meet at the end of the [Pacific railway] 
would be mostly Digger Indians and ‘Heathen Chinees’.”105 While the prospect 
of having “heathen Chinees” as compatriots was probably offensive enough to 
white Canadian sensibilities, the American term “Digger Indian” connoted all 
that was undesirable about the indigenous peoples of the Pacific Slope.106 Lazy, 
dirty, and simian to the settler’s eye, the Digger Indians of California were seen 
as the lowest, most degraded form of humanity, much lower in the hierarchy of 
races than the First Nations to the east of the continental divide.107 In Canada, the 
distance between the Aboriginal peoples of the east and the Diggers was illus-
 100 PRO, CO 60, /38, no. 11, Musgrave to Young, 20 February 1870.
 101 There was, of course, no question of extending the franchise to Aboriginal peoples, or of 
allowing Aboriginal subjects to stand for Parliament.
 102 “The Commons,” Ottawa Citizen (29 March 1871), 2, col. 3; Canada. House of Commons, 
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5-6.
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1880s. For more on Asian stereotypes in Canada, see W. Peter Ward, White Canada Forever: 
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trated succinctly by John Charlton, the Liberal Member for Norfolk North, when 
he asserted in Parliament in 1890 that, “if I am to be compared to an Indian, I 
would rather be compared to an Iroquois [an Eastern people] than to a Digger 
Indian.”108 While colonialism had transformed the “Indians of Caughnawaga” 
into farmers, the Digger Indians with whom the Morning Chronicle populated 
British Columbia were not agriculturalists but “[grabbled] for wild roots, and 
[had] a general fondness for dirt.”109 In California, the degradation of the Digger 
Indian justified expansion and dispossession. For Canadian opponents of the 
British Columbia Terms of Union, the presence of degraded western Aboriginal 
peoples, combined with the lax mores of the settler population and the sterility of 
the soil to present British Columbia as quintessentially un-Canadian space.
Aside from the un-Canadian nature of British Columbia’s geography and 
population, the opponents of the Terms of Union also focussed on the motives of 
the government in endorsing the resolutions. The arguments they chose echoed 
a long tradition of agrarian, or civic republican, suspicions of the excesses of 
the commercial class. As Peter Smith has argued, the use of patronage was the 
main point of contention between agrarian and commercial interests in the pre-
Confederation Province of Canada, and concerns about patronage animated the 
opponents of the British Columbia Terms.110 Increasing the size of the union 
could only increase the scope for government patronage, and indeed the opposi-
tion contended that this had been the cynical aim of Confederation in the first 
place. “Injurious as has been the effect of Confederation to the best interests 
of this province,” opined the Canadian Gleaner, “it has yielded rich fruits to 
Cartier and his colleagues. It has enriched and aggrandized them in every way. 
They look for greater results from this admission of British Columbia.”111
After all, the paper predicted, the Pacific Railway would provide considerably 
more opportunities for corruption than the Intercolonial Railway, a remarkably 
prescient observation considering the scandal that would sweep the govern-
ment from office two years later. The Bowmanville Canadian Statesman was 
much more succinct, worrying what might become of the country “should the 
schemes of Sir John, Sir George, and their hords [sic] of leeches on the public 
chest, not be decisively vetoed by the people.”112
 The opposition was particularly concerned that the principal beneficiaries 
of the government’s new railway patronage would be large private interests. 
 108 Canada. House of Commons, Debates of the House of Commons, 1890 (Ottawa: Queen’s 
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1883), Chapter Two. <www.books-about-california.com/Pages/California_Sketches_2/
CA_Sketches_2_Chpt_02.html>, (viewed 6 November 2005).
 110 Smith, “The Ideological Origins of Canadian Confederation,” 55.
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Fear of corporate capitalism had been a strong feature of pre-Confederation 
reform ideology,  as Allan Greer has demonstrated,  and the prospect of a pri-
vately-constructed but state-subsidized transcontinental railway rejuvenated 
these concerns.113 Where the proponents of the union and of the railway saw 
the fulfillment of the dream of the Northwest Passage,  the opposition remem-
bered a previous gamble on the value of Pacific trade,  the South Sea Bubble of 
1720,  in which rampant speculation had ruined many an investor.114 Now the 
investor that faced ruin was the State. Numerous politicians and newspapers 
feared that cost overruns in the construction of the Pacific railway would drive 
the Dominion to bankruptcy. Aside from the ministers who would profit from 
patronage,  the only beneficiaries of the railway speculation would be large 
capitalists,  who would receive substantial land grants to finance the project. 
The government presented the proposed land grants as a means of financ-
ing railway construction without spending public funds,  but the opposition 
saw it as a massive giveaway of public property to private interests. Richard 
Cartwright,  for example,  warned that the grants were equal in area to several 
American states. Senator Letellier and Oxford North,  Ontario,  MP,  Thomas 
Oliver,  opposed granting the best land in the Northwest Territories to a private 
corporation,  while the Halifax Morning Chronicle spoke of “whole provinces 
to be given away to private capitalists as a guarantee to build a railroad that will 
not pay its working expenses for fifty years!”115 Aside from the economic cost, 
 some also saw in the rise of corporate power a threat to Canadian liberty. David 
Mills,  in an article published the year after the Terms of Union debate,  warned 
that railway companies such as the Canadian Pacific were enemies of popular 
government and suggested that nationalization might be the only solution.116
The anti-corporate sentiment that inspired opposition to the railway scheme, 
 also led the leader of the opposition to dismiss the economic attractions of 
British Columbia. “The gold mines have certainly proved remunerative, ” 
granted Alexander Mackenzie,  “but they are carried on by large companies, ” 
so presumably little of the wealth they produced went to the ordinary miner.117
 113 Greer, “Historical Roots of Canadian Democracy,” 18-22.
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The virtuous Ontario yeoman who settled in British Columbia,  unable to draw 
a living from the land,  could only hope to become the degraded wage slave of 
a mining conglomerate.
The opposition’s arguments failed ultimately to influence the will of 
Parliament. The division in the Commons was 91 in favour (56.9 percent) to 
69 opposed, while in the Senate the resolutions were passed by a slightly larger 
margin of 36 (63.2 percent) to 21. However, a comparison of the Commons 
vote to a division on the purchase of Rupert’s Land in 1869 illustrates just 
how divided Canadian opinion was concerning the British Columbia Terms. 
No roll call exists for the vote on the Rupert’s Land purchase, but what has 
survived is a roll call on an unfriendly amendment to the resolution. Proposed 
and seconded by two members from Nova Scotia, one of whom was the son 
of a prominent anti-Confederate, the amendment characterized the Northwest 
as “a Territory likely to involve this Dominion in a heavy expense without any 
prospect of adequate remuneration.”118 The Commons rejected this conten-
tion by an overwhelming majority of 121 to 15. Those who voted in favour of 
the amendment, and thus against the annexation of Rupert’s Land, apparently 
opposed territorial expansion generally, for they all voted against the British 
Columbia Terms two years later.119 However, many of the most vocal oppo-
nents of the British Columbia Terms had not only opposed the amendment to 
the Rupert’s Land resolutions, but had spoken passionately in favour of the 
purchase. Alexander Mackenzie, though opposed to continued rights for the 
monopolist Hudson’s Bay Company in the Northwest, nevertheless believed 
the Prairie West was a valuable acquisition.120 Alexander Tilloch Galt noted the 
“new field of duty” that the cession of the Hudson’s Bay territories opened for 
Canada.121 Opposition politicians did object strenuously to certain provisions 
of the Manitoba Act of 1870, and their particular concern about Manitoba’s 
parliamentary representation presaged their opposition to the British Columbia 
Terms the following year.122 Despite his misgivings, however, Alexander 
Mackenzie recognized the necessity of organizing a Canadian administration 
for the Red River settlement and was willing to see the Manitoba bill pass 
 118 Canada. House of Commons, Journals of the House of Commons (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 
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without opposition.123 The cases of Rupert’s Land and Manitoba demonstrate 
that opponents of the British Columbia Terms of Union were not motivated by a 
generalized antipathy toward territorial expansion, for they strongly supported 
the integration of the Prairie West into the Dominion.
It is not, of course, surprising that the agrarians supported the purchase 
of the Northwest. As Doug Owram has demonstrated, an old perception of 
the Prairie West as a desert was replaced by the 1860s with a vision of a fer-
tile field for the settlement of Canada’s surplus population.124 The reformers 
dominated the emerging expansionist movement and hoped to replicate on the 
Prairies the virtuous yeoman society they believed existed in rural Ontario. 
“We hope to see a new Upper Canada in the North-west Territory,” opined 
the Globe, “a new Upper Canada in its well-regulated society and government 
— in its education, morality, and religion.”125 The Prairie West offered the 
promise of agrarian utopia, a utopia that Canada could refashion in her own 
image. The commercialists also supported the purchase of Rupert’s Land, 
but for different reasons. Cartier shared the agrarians’ view of the Prairies as 
an outlet for surplus population, but he also believed the acquisition would 
further Canada’s commercial destiny. With the Northwest annexed to the 
Dominion, British Columbia’s admission was imminent, and a Canadian 
transcontinental railway would soon carry “the trades of the east.”126 John 
Alexander Grant spoke of Canada’s centrality in the new global system. “We 
here in Ottawa,” he claimed, “are geographically and politically in the very 
heart of the world, equidistant from Europe on the one side, and Asia on 
the other; and the reasons why we should, and must, in the course of time, 
have a Pacific road of our own, are self-evident.”127 Thus, the Northwest 
could be all things to all people; the Prairie West was both the passage to the 
Orient and the Garden of the World, and this explains the near-unanimity of 
Parliament regarding the desirability of its annexation. William McDougall 
had presented the acquisition of the Northwest as critical to the completion 
of Confederation, and promised that he and other reformers would remain 
in the coalition government “until the work they had undertaken was com-
pleted.”128 Similarly, Timothy Anglin, the New Brunswick anti-Confederate, 
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decided to make the most of the new order and supported the Rupert’s Land 
purchase.129 British Columbia presented no such imperative, and its admis-
sion appealed only to the commercial aspirations of the governing party. After 
the bi-partisanship of the Rupert’s Land debate, the division on the British 
Columbia Terms reflected a hardening of party allegiances.
In 1871, the commercialists’ conception of Canada carried the day, and 
British Columbia was admitted to Confederation with the hope that the barques 
of “the gorgeous East” would soon ply the province’s harbours and the tran-
shipment of their wares would enrich the entire nation. Since Confederation, 
the dichotomy between agriculture and commerce has underpinned not only 
eastern perceptions of British Columbia, but also the province’s own process of 
self-definition. As Daniel Marshall has suggested, the division between city and 
countryside, between commercial and agrarian interests, was a defining con-
flict in British Columbia’s post-Confederation legislature.130 When relations 
between Ottawa and Victoria reached a nadir during the Mackenzie adminis-
tration, the opposition between agriculture and commerce continued to set the 
terms of the debate. Liberal Edward Blake, in his 1874 speech to the Reformers 
of North York, reiterated the conception of British Columbia as “that inhospi-
table country, that ‘sea of mountains’,” while singing the praises of the fertile 
Northwest.131 Meanwhile Malcolm Macleod, writing in the Ottawa Citizen 
under the pseudonym “Britannicus,” continued to press the Canadian Pacific 
Railway as a route to the Orient, and presented the mountainous landscape as 
a defensive asset rather than an agricultural liability.132 In the twentieth cen-
tury, Duff Pattullo’s Liberal government lamented that Musgrave’s argument 
about per capita revenue had not been accepted by Canada, while a popular 
British Columbia historian of the inter-war period, Bruce McKelvie, re-envi-
sioned the construction of an imperial route to the Orient as the true purpose 
of Confederation.133 As late as 2005, Prime Minister Paul Martin sought to 
improve his political fortunes in the west by promoting his government’s 
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“Pacific Gateway Strategy,” a program of infrastructure development with a 
view of encouraging Asian trade to pass through British Columbia ports, as 
“a great national undertaking,” capitalizing on the “great strength of western 
Canada . . . the opening up to Asia-Pacific.”134 In hindsight, the Terms of Union 
debate may be read as an early Canadian discussion of the desirability of glo-
balization. It is, of course, overly anachronistic to see Alexander Mackenzie 
or Timothy Anglin as an ideological forefather of David Orchard or Maude 
Barlow, yet the issues the opponents of the Terms raised in 1871 seem strangely 
familiar. Is the transhipment of international commodities a viable basis for a 
national economy? How sustainable is a country that relies on a foreign coun-
try for its food supply? Should large corporations have a controlling interest 
in Canada’s natural resources and transportation networks? Should political 
influence be predicated upon residency and citizenship, or upon consumption 
and contribution to GNP?
The parliamentary and press debates on the British Columbia Terms of 
Union were about much more than the future of British Columbia. For the 
government and its supporters, swift extension of the Dominion’s boundaries 
to the Pacific promised to make the new country the centre of international 
commerce, with the Canadian Pacific Railway cutting thousands of miles off 
the voyage between Asian and European ports. For the opposition, however, the 
extravagant promises made to secure the admission of a barren, under-popu-
lated colony threatened Canada’s future as a nation of virtuous, self-governing 
yeoman farmers. Thus, Canadian politicians used the proposed admission of 
British Columbia as an opportunity to rearticulate their visions of Canada’s 
future, and in its ideological underpinnings the Terms of Union debate repre-
sents a continuity from earlier discussions on British North American union, 
and a foreshadowing of discussions yet to come. This analysis of the Terms of 
Union discussions suggests we must expand our definition of what constitutes 
the “Confederation Debates” to include the parliamentary discussions about the 
admission of the late-comer provinces, for it is in the significances Canadians 
attached to territorial expansion that their aspirations and anxieties concern-
ing their new nation were most evident. Pitting the opposition’s conception 
of Canada as an agrarian commonwealth against the government’s dream of 
becoming the entrepôt of the Orient, the debate on the admission of British 
Columbia clearly demonstrated that, in the first years of Confederation, a long-
standing conflict over Canada’s character and future remained unresolved.
* * *
134 “Leaders’ Debate,” CBC Television, 16 December 2005, 6:30 p.m., Pacific Standard Time.
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